ABSTRACT An application of a more cost-effective, simplified, and enhanced approach for the design and evaluation of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) called funnel risk graph method (FRGM) is presented in this paper. This approach makes compliance more practicable and standards more useful, resulting to an equal degree of functional safety as compared with the traditional approach. A real-life case study utilizing industrial SIS devices are presented to demonstrate the benefits of this approach. In contrast with other complex schemes commonly used for safety assessment, the proposed FRGM gives benefits such that it is straightforward in steps and resource-efficient while achieving the same safety function. While safety is aimed at protecting the systems from accidental failures to eliminate or minimize hazards, security is focused on protecting the systems from deliberate malicious attacks. They share the same goal-protecting the SIS from failing. Industry cybersecurity has become more critical these days and to address such concern, risk assessment for the security of SIS is proposed to be included in the design and evaluation, as part of the enhancement process.
I. INTRODUCTION
In oil and gas, petrochemical and process industries, SIS, is implemented to safely 'secure liquid inside the pipe' or keep a process under control from hazardous processes, and ensure that the instrumentation for functional safety is in place [1] .
These mission and safety-critical systems prevent physical harm to personnel and/or damage to company property or the environment. In the event that a hazardous process condition is sensed by the ICSS then a safe state will be executed by the SIS. Moreover, in the event of SIS failure, the SIS is expected to force the process into its fail-safe condition, i.e., the condition where the presence of harm is eliminated [1] . For instance, a control valve moves to its fail-open or failclose condition depending on the SIS design. The ultimate objective of designing SIS is to comply with the requirements of SIL. As identified by risk analysis of the related process, a SIS is designed against the SIL [1] . Reference [2] requires Probability of Failure on demand (PFD), which is a requirement of the SIS design. In process industry sector, a more detailed application of SIS is included in [3] . The requirements of SIL must be reflected by the design of the SIS. The architecture of SIS including field devices and systems need to be selected properly to enable safety function as designed.
Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT), as one of the architectural constraints is also examined in this paper. One of the ways to approach SIS issues is suggested by [2] and, for SIS concerning the process industries, by [3] . These international standards [2] , [3] refer to safety system for electric, electronic and programmable electronic systems. Specifically, these international standards set criteria and management guidelines from the 'cradle' or the first phase of the project until the 'grave', which is the end of life of the product. When these international standards are strictly followed, it is often than not, leads to allocation of more resources and time in the safety assessment phase, as such the application is often complicated [4] - [9] . Furthermore, none of the standards are able to provide both a stand-alone safety lifecycle framework and the guidelines necessary for the realization of a diverse range of safety system applications and technologies that are likely to be encountered in industries such as in mining or industrial plant [12] .
Given the complexity of process industries, mining and other plant, SIL and PL allocation should be performed via a quantitative or semi-quantitative methodology where practicable [1] . The size of instrumentation, SIS, project risk assessments yield a large number of hazards, many of which require further consideration and allocation of SIL's or PL's to safety-related systems. In such cases, it may be impracticable to apply a semi-quantitative or quantitative approach due to the substantial amount of time and resources involved. An optimized method for SIS design starts from the assessment phase. This paper complements the economic viability advantage of the SIS design when applied at the assessment phase.
II. SIL AND PL ALLOCATION
SIL and PL allocation for process, mining and other related industries require deeper level of analysis. Adopting the SIL allocation process to the concept of risk reduction as described in [2] and shown in Figure 1 . For each of the Equipment Under Control (EUC) risk identified, the level of risk is calculated or estimated and then one or more risk reduction measures are designated. The objective of this risk management approach is to apply sufficient risk reduction measures against the EUC risk such that the ''actual risk reduction'' exceeds the ''necessary risk reduction'' to achieve an acceptable ''tolerable risk''.
Functional safety standards [2] , [3] , [10] , [17] , [18] provide different methodologies for SIL allocation, ranging from simple qualitative methods to more complex quantitative methods. Guidelines for quantitative and semi-quantitative SIL allocation are presented in Table 1 : Guidelines for qualitative and semi-qualitative methods for SIL allocation are presented in Table 2 : 
III. FUNNEL RISK GRAPH METHOD (FRGM)
A. SAFETY LIFECYCLE The 16 phase IEC61508 safety lifecycle with the inclusion of IEC62061, IEC61511, ISO13849 and AS4024.1 as a combined safety lifecycle process [12] aims to establish safety requirements for plant, considering the specific circumstances and risks (e.g., environmental, operational, etc) associated with its use, maintenance until the duration of the life of the plant.
The following phases of the safety lifecycle should be driven by the end-user to ensure that the safety requirements are appropriate for the specific application: Figure 2 , which was based on [3] in reference to the general scheme described in [2] but characterized as a ''funnel'' approach. Typically, a medium-sized plant is comprised of thousands of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF). Instead of subjecting all SIF one-by-one to a much complex (semi-quantitative or quantitative) assessment process, the FRGM (qualitative) is aimed to use as a funnel or an ''initial pass''. If the assessed safety-related systems received SIL allocation of greater than SIL2 during the ''initial pass'' then a semi-quantitative or a quantitative method as a ''final pass'' should be conducted, or the multi-disciplinary assessment team reached an agreement to justify the ''second pass'', or pose a high EUC risk. The responsibility for performing a SIL/PL allocation should not be passed off to the designers as they may not have sufficient specific information to do this. The multi-disciplinary site personnel should perform a risk assessment based on their specific application of the EUC, determine the safety functions and SIL/PL on the basis of their notion of 'tolerable risk', and then communicate this to the designer through Safety Requirements Specifications (SRS). This methodology utilizes several parameters. It illustrates the level of the hazardous situation in the event that the SIS fails or become unavailable.
B. COMPARISON OF STEPS BETWEEN FRGM AND TRADITIONAL METHOD (LOPA) 1) FRGM
The three (3) steps to the proposed FRGM approach are as follows:
Step 1. Select one parameter (say Consequence C2 parameter) from Figure 2 ;
Step 2. Chosen parameters are then linked to other parameters (Exposure, Probability, Demand W);
Step 3. Resolve the SIL allocated to the SIF. For example, Consequence C2, Frequency F1, Probability P1 with demand W3 would yield a SIL1. But if the Probability changes to P2 with the same condition, then SIL2 is allocated. The FRGM approach can also be utilized to enable assessment of SIS where the potential consequences include severe environmental impact or property loss.
2) TRADITIONAL METHOD (LOPA)
For the purpose of showing the difference between the proposed FRGM, the traditional semi-quantitative LOPA [3] method is selected with summary of multiple steps as follows:
a. With the guidance of LOPA-trained person, prepare data developed in the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis and accounts for each identified hazard by documenting the initiating cause and the protection layers that prevent or mitigate the hazard:
• 
C. COMPARATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRGM AND TRADITIONAL METHOD
Given the complexity of process industries, SIL and PL allocation should be performed via a quantitative or semiquantitative methodology. However, as emphasized, it may be impracticable to apply a semi-quantitative or quantitative approach due to the substantial amount of time and resources involved, thus FRGM approach is proposed. The main difference with this proposed technique is that, instead of jumping in to costly and time-consuming methods (semiquantitative or quantitative), all SIF will first undergo FRGM (qualitative), which usually takes only a few minutes for each SIF to collaborate with a multi-disciplinary team assuming that calibration process has been completed. Only those SIF which falls under the following category, which typically around 5% of the total SIF, will undergo a quantitative or semi-quantitative method:
• SIF with SIL allocation of more than SIL2 during the FRGM ''initial pass''
• Did not achieve a satisfactory level of consensus within the multi-disciplinary team during the ''initial pass''
• Pose a high EUC risk Table 4 shows the comparative differences between the standard quantitative methods such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [2] , Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and semi-quantitative method Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) [2] , as compared to the proposed FRGM approach at 100,000 SIF. Cost reduction is realized by the number of hours spent by a multi-disciplinary team. Pros and cons using the proposed FRGM approach as compared to the standard approach are shown in Table 4 . The coarser or less accurate assessment of risk using the FRGM is not a concern as it is used as a funnel from a broad range of SIL 0 to SIL 2.
In a typical process plant, approximately 95% of the SIF falls on SIL 2 or under and an estimated 5% falls on SIL 3 or above. Interestingly, the same safety function can be achieved using any of the methodology as shown in Table 10 . A lot of resources can be saved using the simple FRGM. For example, if the Consequence parameter is C1 (calibrated as minor injury) then it is easily determined to be no special safety requirement using the FRGM that only takes a few minutes. Similarly, if we have a Consequence C2, Frequency F1 and either of any Probabilities or Demand W then we will arrive into a maximum SIL 2.
Further comparison using our real-life case example as shown in Table 10 ; using the traditional complex approach (say LOPA), we will arrive with the same safety function result using FRGM as shown in Table 9 .
Calibration process of the FRGM is required, primarily, to align the SIL chosen within the bounds of corporate risks. Calibration also considers other risks' sources, for verification purposes and to describe the parameters in the light of corporate context. Decision makers in the organization are responsible for allocating quantifiable values to risk graph parameters. It is the discretion of the management how they classify the risk parameters according to what their experts believe. Different organization foresees risk differently but in general, there are many forms of commonality among them. Table 5 is an example of calibration for chemical processes. Table 6 shows the corresponding equivalence between the ISO13849 PL (PL a, b, c, d and e) and IEC61508 / IEC61511 SIL [2] , [10] (2, 3 and 4) has been depicted in issues of ISO13849-1 [17] since 2006 [12] . Table 7 shows the equivalence between the machinery safeguarding categories [18] (CATB, 1 2, 3 and 4) and SIL [2] , [10] (SIL 1, 2 and 3). 
D. THE EQUIVALENCE OF SIL AND PL

E. THE EQUIVALENCE OF SIL AND CAT
IV. REAL-LIFE CASE STUDY
In order to show the simplicity and effectiveness of this scheme, a block diagram of a conveyor safety system with three SIF is presented in Figure 3 .
A. SIF#1, SIF#2 AND SIF#3 ANALYSES
The process involves transporting and handling of solids through a conveyor belt. All SIF is designed to disable any movement of the conveyor belt and its associated equipment during emergency or metal detection. SIF#1 safety switches activation is done via pulling the trip cable or from a broken trip cable i.e., total loss of tension on it. The two NormallyClose (NC) switches are connected in series; opening of the contacts of any of the two switches will activate the SIL-BUS/PILZ relay system [28] and trips the conveyor. A beacon light is also connected to indicate switch activation. SIF#2 metal detector is used to sense any unwanted presence of metal in the conveyor and eventually disable conveyor movement. SIF#3 operator lanyard safety switches have similar function to SIF#1. However, the risk is located near to the operator station, where permanent exposure or almost permanent exposure is evident.
The collaborative risk assessment [2] was conducted by a team of multi-disciplinary personnel which was composed of process control engineer, process specialist, safety specialist, control room and field operators. Figure 4 shows the safety switch -SIF#1 -A100 and was evaluated using the proposed FRGM. The FRGM serves as an ''initial pass'' before going into a much complex assessment process, if required.
Using the FRGM steps mentioned in Section III:
Step 1: Select one parameter (Consequence C3 parameter was selected). C3 -Permanent disability or fatality;
Step 2: Chosen parameters are then linked to other parameters (Exposure F1, Probability P1, and Demand W3). F1 -rare to frequent exposure, P1 -avoidance is possible under certain conditions, W3 -function is demanded more than once per year;
Step 3: Resolve the SIL allocated to the SIF. In this case, it was easily evaluated that the SIL for SIF#1 -A100 is SIL 2 as shown in Figure 5 . Since this is only SIL 2, it can be used as the assessed SIL. If the assessed safety-related system received SIL allocation of greater than SIL 2, during the ''initial pass'' then a semi-quantitative or a quantitative method as a ''final pass'' should be conducted. This is true in the case of SIF#3 -A200, which received a SIL 3. Since this SIF demands a higher safety function, it is justified that it will undergo a more complex process such as quantitative methodology.
At the discretion of the multi-disciplinary assessment team, they can come into an agreement to justify the ''final pass'' even though the outcome of FRGM is SIL 2 or less. Further justification for a final pass also includes those SIFs that are involved in preventing or mitigating high consequence events and which are the only risk control against a risk.
Using the FRGM and corporate calibrated risk graph shown in Table 8 , the result of safety risk assessment is shown in Table 9 . SIL 2 is required for SIF#1 -A100, SIL 1 for SIF#2 -M100 and SIL 3 for SIF#3 -A200.
B. HARDWARE FAULT TOLERANCE (HFT)
HFT is one of the key design aspects. The probability of failure of a function can be reduced by (a) increasing the proof testing and/or increasing the coverage (this is not covered in this paper), (b) selecting devices with lower failure rates and, (c) applying a fault tolerant design -which, means that the function can continue to function successfully with one or more failed components applying redundancy in design patterns [27] . HFT of n means that n + 1 faults are needed to defeat the safety function. Devices being used in an n-outof-k redundant arrangement have a HFT = k-n, e.g., 1oo2 sensor arrangement has a HFT = 2-1 = 0. Hence using our example, the safety switch -SIF#1 -A100, the probability that both two safety switches used in series to fail is lower than the probability of a single switch failing. Using the traditional practice utilizing the international standards [3] , SIS design was intended to function such that no single fault would cause in the loss of safety function. The rationale of HFT, for instance HFT of 1 means that in system architectures such as 1oo2 or 2oo3, is that they can still function on demand (when needed) despite of the existing 1 dangerous fault. This standard scheme is utilized to ensure that the system is robust enough to handle random hardware faults. The level of fault tolerance that is appropriate increases with the risk reduction required. Systematic faults are also one of the failures that fault tolerance architectures can be protected against. Such faults primarily occur as a random hardware failures. Generally-accepted ways to measure the effectiveness and attributes of fault tolerant systems are reliability and Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) [28] .
Reference [3] defines minimum HFT requirements for the sensors, logic solvers and final elements that make up each safety function. The hardware fault tolerance required by [3] has been too onerous to achieve in practice. Most users have found it difficult to comply with the standard. The methods of assessing the HFT requirements are complicated and difficult to use [11] . It is envisage that HFT would become more practicable and would rely on better systematic integrity to include audit of vendors' integrated management system.
C. PREVIOUS INCIDENTS & VENDOR VERIFICATION
Analysis of maintenance history and previous incident records of SIF#1 showed that there were more than 20 broken safety switches in the past as shown in Figure 6 . Further detailed investigation revealed that the slider mechanism molding was incorrect as shown in Figure 7 , thus failed to demonstrate ''proven-in-use'', and non-SIL or CAT-rated.
D. SAFE FAILURE FRACTION (SFF)
SFF is the fraction of the overall random hardware failure rate of a device resulting to a detected dangerous failure or a safe failure, as shown in Figure 8 . SFF is part of an evaluation of random failures. This information can normally be obtained from the vendor.
The standards set out the quantitative and qualitative requirements for the design and implementation of SIS to achieve the required risk reduction. The qualitative requirements must be considered to estimate the PFD or the PFH, according to the frequency of demand. A demand is a process deviation that must be handled by the SIS. Low demand mode means that the SIS experiences a low frequency of demands, typically less than once per year and the PFD parameter must be calculated. If more frequent demands are expected for the safety function, typically several times a year, the SIS is operating in high or continuous mode and PFH must be considered. These parameters indicate the average probability of SIS's failure to perform its design function on demand, of each safety function. They are concern only on the dangerous random failures that are physical failures where the supplied service deviates from the specified service due to physical degradation of the item. The qualitative requirements, instead, are related to the architectural constraints that limit the achievable SIL based on HFT and the SFF of the subsystem.
When assessing the SFF and diagnostic coverage of a system, all components should be taken into account including electrical, electronic, electromechanical, mechanical, among others, which require to allow the subsystem to process the safety function(s).
Those mentioned components need to be carefully considered to function in the event:
• that all of the possible dangerous modes of failure leading to an unsafe state,
• that it prevents a safe response in the event that an action is demanded or otherwise defeat the safety integrity of the safety-related systems [2] . Using our example SIF#1 in Figure 4 , considering the SFF, the maximum SIL claim limit according to the architectural constraints [3] , [4] is SIL 2. The SFF must meet the criteria of 60% ≤ SFF < 90% per Table 8 . If the SFF falls below 60% then the maximum SIL claim limit according to the architectural constraints [3] , [4] is SIL 1.
It is proposed that SFF would rely more on confidence data from previous installations and satisfactory audit of vendors' integrated management system in representing SFF and exposing dangerous undetected failures λ du .
V. CYBERSECURITY
While safety is aimed at protecting the systems from accidental failures to eliminate or minimize hazards, security FIGURE 9. Cyber security management system [29] .
is focused on protecting the systems from deliberate malicious attacks [30] . Technology in the past does not demand that automation systems to be integrated and connected to the Internet, however, due to the proliferation of Internetconnected systems, security has become increasingly important. Even though SIS is typically not connected to the outside world, malicious hacking is still not impossible. With this vulnerability, it is proposed that SIS security risk assessment should be included in its design and evaluation. This is the enhancement approach of this proposal.
The standard [29] elaborates the elements and provides guidance on what should be included for the establishment of an organisation's cyber security management system (CSMS) for ICSS as a whole, in which SIS is part of. The CSMS elements pertain in this standard are majority discussed about policy, procedure, practice and personnel management suggesting what should be part of the organisation's CSMS. Figure 9 [29] represents the elements of the cyber security management system, which has three main categories:
• Risk analysis, • Addressing risk with the CSMS, and • Monitoring and improving the CSMS FRGM is included in the risk analysis phase.
A. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Reference [24] , there are three main viewpoints when examining for the meaning of the security in a specific system; A.1. The first viewpoint is about the manner in which the attacker approach the victim's target data or system -in case of (1) personal attack, the proactive defense commonly used is physical security. If the attack is (2) thru electronic network, the commonly used proactive defense is system or network security.
A.2. The second viewpoint examines the objective of the security that is aimed to be achieved. It outlines the basic types of physical or cyber security threats that the system needs to be protected against.
A.3. The third viewpoint pertains to the level of trust that a stakeholder can achieve in a specific system that applies to the security objectives.
There are eight objectives of security as enumerated below. From these security objectives, it can easily be categorised and compare security methods:
•Confidentiality: This security objective pertains to protecting information from being accessed by unauthorized parties, which can be persons or systems. For ICSS, this is in particular to access rights from workstations, domains and 3 rd party systems that are interconnected to the ICSS. User accounts, passwords, keys and other confidential codes related to the specific ICSS.
•Integrity: This security objective pertains to ensuring the authenticity of information, that the information/data is not changed or modified by unauthorised parties. For ICSS, this applies to information/data such as systems' configuration, database, SIS registers, sensor/control valve configuration, etc. Systems' integrity, if not completely protected, may cause safety issues.
•Availability: This security objective simply means that the authorised users can access information/data. For ICSS, this denotes that all IT-related components of the process or plant, like workstations and servers used for control and safety systems, consoles for operators, engineering terminals/workstations, manufacturing execution systems (MES), including communication interface systems between these components and connectivity to the outside facilities. In a running industrial plant, when an operator cannot control or see the process, catastrophic events can happen. A denial of service is a loss of systems' availability.
•Authentication: This security objective pertains to verifying the real identity of an account or a system. It is the process of examining if the person or system is in fact, who or what it is, as declared previously.
•Authorization: The aim of authorization objective is to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate (unauthorised) users, giving access to only legitimate ones and restricting otherwise. In ICSS, it is ensuring that only authorised users can access or perform pre-defined tasks depending on the security level that has been pre-approved to a specific user.
•Auditability: Auditability means you can back track what has happened previously. This may be in a form of event logs, trend graphs, alarm messages, etc., to establish relevant facts for investigative purposes of a security incident or systems' malfunction. Most importantly, the objective is to plan course of action to prevent recurrence of such incident.
•Nonrepudiability: The security objective of nonrepudiability denotes to establish liability and accountability.
It is providing unquestionable evidence to a 3rd party who requested the information.
•Third-party protection: This security objective pertains to preventing damage done to third parties via the IT system [25] .
B. IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF SIS/ICSS SECURITY
Primarily, safety is the most important requirement for SIS/ICSS. SIS/ICSS need to ensure that the systems fail to its fail-safe state, that it will not endanger human lives, cause damage to environment and properties. Unlike the IT systems, the security requirements evolve around security objectives of confidentiality and integrity [25] .
Secondly, it is important that the SIS/ICSS poses security requirement of availability. The SIS/ICSS must be available for operations over expected period of time. SIS/ICSS shutdown or other related activities that may lead to SIS/ICSS shutdown must be properly planned and scheduled such that systems' availability in a running plant is not compromised. Backup system in order to prevent or lessen systems' unavailability must be properly planned and executed. Antivirus update must be performed regularly and must not affect running plant. Software updates and patches must be carefully planned and configure such that it will not affect the running application or operating system. Software testing should be done to ensure that there are no bugs or to uncover bugs, and ensure the software meets the requirements of users.
The emphasis of ICSS security is on process automation devices, e.g., Distributed Control Systems (DCS), SIS and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These are critical systems that may compromise the safety of the plant and therefore must be protected from any kind of threats and vulnerabilities, allowing only authorised user access to these systems. Level of access must also be defined, e.g., operator, engineer or administrator, depending on the required user rights.
C. SECURITY INCIDENTS & SURVEY
Security survey [13] showed some catastrophic incidents such as the 2014 German steel mill incident [14] and ICSS-targeting malware such as Havex and Dragonfly [15] .
Although the controllers at the nuclear fuel factory were not connected to the internet, the Stuxnet [20] malware managed to successfully hinder the operations of the plant for a long term. The attackers were fully aware of their target victim -they have studied that the computers were not connected to the internet or air-gapped from the internet, thus they have used five outside companies as a means to get inside the system. They have specifically infected the controllers at the nuclear fuel factory via USB flash drives. The Stuxnet malware specifically targets Siemens Step 7 PLC software via Microsoft Windows operating system. The Stuxnet-infected system compromised the safety of the Iranian PLCs causing the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear them apart. After the Stuxnet, another malware called Shamoon was discovered and considered as the most destructive after the emergence VOLUME 5, 2017 of Stuxnet. The Shamoon did not disrupt an industrial plant, however, it is destructive in the sense that it erased and overwrote the data on the hard drives of around 30,000 to 50,000 workstations of Saudi Aramco. Like Stuxnet, Duqu and Flame, it pursued large energy companies in the Middle East, this time Saudi Aramco. The Shamoon malware was injected by a dissatisfied insider who took control of a computer that is connected to the internet. Shamoon propagates to other computers which utilizes Microsoft Windows even they are not connected to the Internet. [19] .
The pervasive cyber-attack on the Bureau of Meteorology in Australia recommended the complete replacement of the weather agency's system. The cost of the remedy was estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, as the bureau's systems could not be shut down while it was being cleansed [23] .
Survey [16] respondents show that it is significantly important to concentrate efforts on the security of IT devices and its applications instead of the ICSS components, themselves. Reference to Table 11 , the integration of IT into control system networks, 19% of the respondents believe that it is ranked third in the threat vector by 46%. More stakeholders are now becoming aware of the risks associated in using IP-based technology into the ICSS. [16] . Unlike the days where the IT network is separate to the control systems network, the threat now is significant and alarming to the business that a full time Process Control Network Security Specialist is justified and not just an ''and'' to the job description of a Control Systems engineer.
Furthermore, the introduction of the integration of control and safety systems networks posed even greater security threat to the SIS. Although standard [2] specifically sets the guidelines for separation of functions of control system and safety system, in the real-world scenario, plant operators often wishes to use common operational environments for both the control & monitoring and the SIS. For instance, the Yokogawa Vnet/IP where the Centum VP DCS and the ProSafe-RS SIS are integrated into one network-the Vnet/IP. Yokogawa SIS software ProSafe-RS utilises the same architecture of the Centum VP. Thus, integrated system can be achieved by interconnecting these two compatible systems. Whilst this has been done to comply with the increasing demand of integrated operational environment [21] , the same integration makes ProSafe-RS SIS even more vulnerable to cyber-attacks than the traditional standalone system. Yokogawa acknowledges such risks, thus, it provides security against threats from an external network, such as cyber-attacks. Vnet/IP connects the devices that make up the CENTUM and ProSafe-RS systems. It allows the exchange of control data among these devices. Vnet/IP is a control network that complies with the international standard [22] . Given the consequences related to cybersecurity, it is proposed to include security risk assessment against hacking and malware in the evaluation of the SIS and calibrate the FRGM or other applicable methodology, accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Design and evaluation of SIS should be practicably undertaken with due respect to the requirements of current Work, Health & Safety laws. The standards provide planning in detail to assess the safety performance of SIS; however, it is often very complex. This paper highlights the advantages of using a FRGM as a preliminary qualitative approach to be used in the design and evaluation of SIS, which may reduce analysis times and thus bring economic benefits. The approach is presented as a screening tool, before a more detailed analysis is carried out. Instead of subjecting all SIF one-by-one to a much complex assessment process, the FRGM is used as a funnel or an ''initial pass''. If the assessed safety-related system received SIL allocation of greater than SIL 2 during the ''initial pass'' then a semi-quantitative or a quantitative method as a ''final pass'' should be conducted, or the multi-disciplinary assessment team reached an agreement to justify the ''second pass'', or pose a high EUC risk.
A comparison with other established methods of evaluation is presented, along with a real-life case study. The presented FRGM attracts optimised approach in the design and evaluation of SIS because it is straightforward in steps and resourceefficient. This approach makes standards more useful and compliance more practicable. Albeit its simplicity, the proposed approach provides an equal degree of functional safety and supplements the standards that leads to cost-reduction of the safety design as compared to traditional methods.
An important step to proactively include and align cybersecurity risk assessment against hacking, malware or any cyber threats in the design and evaluation of the SIS is proposed, as part of the enhancement from existing traditional methods. The evolution of SIS/ICSS towards increasing interconnection with other enterprise networks or even the internet creates an increased exposure of automation systems to network-based attacks. Even if the computers were not connected to the internet or air-gapped from the internet, attackers can devise scheme to infiltrate companies to get inside the system. IT security has been an issue for office automation and e-commerce environments for quite some time, and many concepts and tools developed for these applications remain relevant and should be reused in SIS/ICSS. Another challenge for securing SIS/ICSS is posed by automation devices that lack basic security functionality, e.g., the capability to define user accounts, or support for secure communication protocols.
More research work needs to be done to seamlessly align SIS/ICSS design and evaluation to cybersecurity into one effective framework. Currently, several standardization initiatives on security for industrial communication systems are under way. Some initiatives (e.g., ISA SP99 and IEC SC65c WG13) are concerned with documenting existing security best practices. These best practices can also be applied to SIS/ICSS in operation today.
